

**Vol. 8, No. 3
September 2013**

CEU Political Science Journal

**Department of Political Science
Central European University**

CEU Political Science Journal
Department of Political Science
Central European University, Budapest
September 2013

Advisory Board

S.M. Amadae, Ohio State University
Gabriela Borz, University of Aberdeen
Andras Bozoki, CEU Budapest
Anil Duman, CEU Budapest
Carol Harrington, Victoria University of Wellington
Karen Henderson, University of Leicester
Herbert Kitschelt, Duke University
Levente Littvay, CEU Budapest
Cristian Pirvulescu, SNSPA Bucharest
Phillippe C. Schmitter, EUI Florence
Carsten Q. Schneider, CEU Budapest
Jan Zielonka, University of Oxford

Editors

Sergiu Gherghina, Goethe University Frankfurt
Arpad Todor, European University Institute, Florence

Editorial Board

Dorothee Bohle, CEU Budapest
Mihail Chiru, CEU Budapest
Zsolt Enyedi, CEU Budapest
Rebecca J. Hannagan, Northern Illinois University
Dylan Kissane, CEFAM Lyon
Robert Sata, CEU Budapest
Daniela Sirinic, University of Zagreb
Jan Smolenski, New School for Social Research
Maria Spirova, Leiden University
Andreas Umland, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Editorial Assistants

Ela Genc, CEU Budapest
Theresa Gessler, CEU Budapest

ISSN: 1818-7668

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Daniel Agbiboa

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Political Culture of Corruption and Cleanups in Nigeria 273

Niels Smeets, Johan Adriaensen, and Yf Reykers

Learning to Talk the Talk: Re-Appraising the External Perspective in the EU's Foreign Policy 296

Olga Sholderer

The Drivers of Police Reform: The Cases of Georgia and Armenia 323

Esref Kenan Rasidagic

Involved by Default: External Actors and Foreign Policy of the Western Balkan States 348

BOOK REVIEWS

Pippa Norris, *Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Reviewed by: Victoria Makulilo 369

Sandipani Dash, *Sudan's Oil Diplomacy, 1991-2003* (New Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2012)

Reviewed by: Dinoj K. Upadhyay 371

Samuel Bowles, *The New Economics of Inequality and Redistribution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Reviewed by: Nicolae Bîea 374

Isabelle Delpla, Xavier Bougarel, and Jean-Louis Fournel (eds), *Investigating Srebrenica. Institutions, Facts, Responsibilities* (New York: Berghahn Books 2012)

Reviewed by: Patrick Hein 376

Tobias Endler, *How To Be A Superpower: The Public Intellectual Debate on the Global Role of the United States after September 11* (Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2012)

Reviewed by: Scott Nicholas Romaniuk 379

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 382

CfP Vol. 9, No. 1, February 2014 384

INVOLVED BY DEFAULT: EXTERNAL ACTORS AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE WESTERN BALKAN STATES

Esref Kenan Rasidagic
University of Sarajevo

Abstract:

The foreign policy of the Western Balkan states is formulated on the basis of several factors, many of which do not reflect their strategic national interests. An important contributing factor is that all Western Balkan countries could be defined as small states, despite the fact that within the region some of them are considered as being comparatively large and strong. The potential for formulation and implementation of foreign policy in all of these states is very low, due to a number of reasons. These include small territories and population, weak economies, unfinished democracy-building processes, and a generally unsettled situation, typical of transitional societies. All these aspects make states in the region to a large extent dependant on the interests of bigger powers, as well as susceptible to policies of the international organizations active in the region. Western Balkan states, therefore, to varying extents, identify their foreign policies with the policies of different external actors.

Keywords: foreign policy, small states, Western Balkans, European Union

1. Introduction¹

The issue of the capacity of small states to conduct foreign policy has received due attention in the literature.² However, studies that would highlight the ways that newly independent, transitional, relatively poor and complex states in the Western Balkans formulate their foreign policy choices and conduct foreign policy are very few. Jovic highlighted some of the challenges faced by Croatia as it embarked on the path of the European Integrations.³ Djukanovic, Kovacevic, Nikolic, Djukanovic and Ladjevac, and Novakovic similarly chart evolution of Serbia's foreign policy in

1 This article was written as part of the author's engagement in the University of Pecs, Hungary, sponsored by the 2013 Think Visegrad Fellowship.

2 David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (Westport: Greenwood Pub Group, 1980); Christopher Hill, "What Is to Be Done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action", *International Affairs* (79) 2 (2003): 233-255; Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19 (4) (2006): 651-668.

3 Dejan Jovic, "Hrvatska vanjska politika pred izazovima clanstva u Europskoj Uniji" (Croatian Politics ahead of Challenges of the EU Membership), *Politicka misao*, vol. 48, no. 2, 2011.

post-Balkan wars era.⁴ Arapovic meanwhile published the only systemic study of development of foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵

To date, however, no author has attempted a comparative study of foreign policy choices made by these three central Western Balkan states in the light of similar difficulties and opportunities they have by virtue of their position and shared histories. This article attempts to highlight foreign policy actions taken by the three central Western Balkan states that necessitated involvement of external actors in resolution of particular problems.

This study is based on case studies of the three Western Balkan states. With a focus on textual analysis of primary sources including foreign policy strategy papers, the article will lay out the visions of foreign policies as articulated by the three states. This will be analyzed in light of the main trends in three states' foreign policies over the past decade.

This article intends to illustrate how an insufficient ability to formulate and implement foreign policy choices makes Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina examples of the limits to sovereignty of small states in modern globalized world. To this end, the article examines the larger theoretical framework guiding our study of foreign policy making in small states. Next, the article discusses the three cases studies of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, highlighting the specific developments in each country, and main characteristics of their domestic political framework influencing the foreign policy decision making process. Finally, in conclusion, the article examines whether small state necessarily means weak state in international arena, or is such weakness product of internal policy making shortcomings identified in the three counties discussed here.

2. Theoretical Framework

The literature on the foreign policies of small states has for the most part focused on external threats and the reactions of small states designed to jump on a bandwagon or accommodate the threat. Such literature is inspired by the realist and neo-realist tradition in international relations. The focus on the international system has

4 Dragan Djukanovic, Miladin Kovacevic, and Ivan Nikolic, *The Current Status Quo and Prospects for Serbia's European Integration* (Bratislava: Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2008); Dragan Djukanovic and Ivona Ladjevac, "Prioriteti spoljnopoliticke strategije Republike Srbije" (Priorities of foreign policy strategy of the Republic of Serbia), *International Problems*, Vol. LXI, no. 3, 2009: 343-364; Igor Novakovic, *From our Pillars of Foreign Policy to European Integration: Is there a Will for Strategically Orienting Serbia's Foreign Policy?* (Belgrade: ISAC Fund International and Security Affairs Centre, 2013).

5 Adis Arapovic, *Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Determinants and Perspectives* (Tuzla: Centri civilnih inicijativa, 2010).

obfuscated the significance of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policy. Arguing that small states do not simply react to external stimuli, this paper makes the case that the domestic politics of the three Western Balkan states play a determining role in their foreign policy. Domestic political elites and their ideas – or the lack thereof – shape the foreign policy visions of the three Western Balkan states. Lack of capacity to properly formulate and implement the right foreign policy choices by default involves external powers in the politics of these Western Balkan states.

A central feature of all Western Balkan states is their small size, limiting the range of foreign policy choices they can pursue. What defines a state as 'small'? Some definitions focus on territory, GDP, population, while the other focus on power relations, the so called relational theory which maintains that states are small in relation to other bigger states, that is, a state is small if it is unable to affect changes in the international system.⁶ Another definition focuses on dependence, defining small states as states that are dependent on the great powers.⁷ According to this view, the smaller the state, the less independent it is in reality. While asserting their nominal independence, in the international arena they are nothing but the clients of bigger and stronger states.

No state in the modern world, no matter the size, could be considered as completely independent in the classical sense of the word. A globalized economic structure and processes necessitate inter-state cooperation, where no country is self-sufficient anymore. In terms of foreign policy and security, as Dejan Jovic argues in his discussion of Croatian foreign policy, "globalization of the world politics poses new security challenges, even for the most powerful world states (...) International system is now based on the principle of interdependence".⁸ For the reason of security alone, no state today could fully protect its interests without participation in global networks, which presumes the transfer of part of an individual state's sovereignty to these international organizations. Looking at the states of the Western Balkans, they all undoubtedly fall into the category of small states. Montenegro with the population below 700,000 could even be considered a microstate, while Serbia with the population of over 7,000,000 is relatively large in relation to its neighbors but remains a small state according to all other criteria.

The foreign policy of small states has been recently analyzed more and more consistently, especially in the context of the functioning of the European Union. Christopher Hill in his analysis of foreign policy explains why some foreign policy

6 Thorhallsson and Wivel, "Small States in the European Union".

7 Vital, *The Inequality of States*.

8 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Milner and Moravcsik, Power, interdependence, and non state actors in world politics, cited in Dejan Jovic, "Hrvatska vanjska politika pred izazovima clanstva u Europskoj Uniji," 9.

tools are appropriate or only possibilities for small states. Their power is limited, thus their influence is limited and hence their options for making certain choices are limited.⁹

Scholars traditionally equate small states with weak states, incapable of independently advancing their foreign policy interests. They were accordingly expected to seek a patron, a bigger power that would protect their security and foreign policy interests in exchange for loyalty. The world changes but not at the speed that would make tangible characteristics like the resources, the territory, the GDP, and the population irrelevant. Yet researchers have also suggested that small states, "lacking the resources and ability to identify and assess developments effectively in areas which have high salience for them" are actually more likely to engage in hazardous acts in the foreign policy arena.¹⁰ Risky actions can reap great rewards in the foreign policy domain. They can also wreak havoc in the perpetrator's internal policy and destroy its standing in the international arena, but, again, small states could lack the instruments for holding the political elites accountable for their deeds. Lack of accountability is known to encourage risk taking among the elites.

A problem occurs when a small state decides to pledge loyalty to a larger power but in exchange does not get more security or prosperity. This article focuses on exactly that reality: it studies foreign policy choices small states in the Western Balkans make that do not necessarily advance their interests. Or to be more precise, this article is about policy choices Western Balkan states make that reflect their weakness and incompleteness, their lack of understanding what foreign policy options they actually have at their disposal.

The European Union, NATO, the United States, Russia and Turkey, are all to a different extent and in various ways involved in developments in all or some of the states in the region. Due to their – even if only qualified, or relative – might, their foreign policy, economic, strategic, and other interests largely dictate the activities of the Western Balkan states in the foreign policy realm. This article will also demonstrate the extent to which the dictates and interests of different external actors influence mutual relations of the Western Balkan states. The article analyzes the effects of the process of the EU and NATO integrations on the policies of the states in the region, especially the effects which the membership in these organizations has on resolving the existing bilateral problems and disputes.

9 Hill, "What Is to Be Done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action".

10 Maurice East, "Foreign Policy-Making in Small States: Some Theoretic Observations Based on a Study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs", *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Dec., 1973): 504-505.

In the European context, states in the Western Balkans rank as the youngest, with the exception of Albania, which in 2013 celebrated its 100th anniversary. Even if we acknowledge the arguments that today's Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro are direct descendants of their respective kingdoms in the Middle Ages or the late Ottoman era, the international recognition of states in the Western Balkans we discuss here took place in the late 20th or the early 21st century, while Kosovo is still in the process of international recognition and Macedonia does not manage to fully embark on the accession path to the EU and NATO over the so-called 'name issue'.

For the sake of clarity, this article discusses foreign policy decision making processes in only three Western Balkan states: Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These three states illustrate different policy options utilized by the political elites and institutions, as will be demonstrated: from dependence on foreign interests bordering on clientelism, to attempts of independent go-it-alone policy making, to states whose very sovereignty and capability to rationally make foreign policy could be questioned.

The story of small states in the modern international arena could be viewed from different angles. First of all, a state could be in position to independently and willingly choose certain foreign policy objectives and alliances (although it could feel it was actually compelled to make such choice). Such is, we will argue, position adopted by Serbia in its confrontation with the US and the EU over the Kosovo issue. Another case is when a state, in the Western Balkan context, *does not have* much power to decide on foreign policy issues, due to domination of external factors and considerations in domestic politics (as is the case with Croatia and early Bosnia and Herzegovina). A state, again, could ally itself with interests of more powerful actors in the international arena for purely rational, short-term, goals. Or it could opt to pursue long-term accommodation with the great power in question, which could eventually lead to dangerous obscuring of genuine foreign policy interests and blurring of the lines between 'alliance' or 'friendship' and pure clientelism and subservience to the great power. Foreign policy of the three central Western Balkans states will therefore be explored here in light of Christopher Hill's discussion of the spectrum of possible foreign policy actions.¹¹

3. The Foreign Policy of Western Balkan states

3.1 Serbia

In foreign policy terms, Serbia represents an interesting case for studying the huge ambitions and real life limitations of foreign policies of small states. Hill actually

11 Hill, "What Is to Be Done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action".

cites Serbia as an example of what he calls the 'autistic power politics', i.e. "a self-regarding concern for the perceived needs of a state (often generated by internal problems) without concern for the impact on others".¹² It is difficult, however, to determine what needs the Serbian state prioritizes in its foreign policy. Ever since the *de facto* dissolution of the second Yugoslavia in April 1992 no strategic documents were adopted by the government in Belgrade that would define foreign policy of the newly formed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and Montenegro.¹³ The only exception to this was the speech by the newly elected Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Goran Svilanovic, following a change of government in Belgrade on 5 October 2000, emphasizing the necessity for formulation of new foreign policy of Yugoslavia in order to overcome a decade of the country's international isolation.¹⁴ Over the preceding decade, Serbia's autistic political considerations brought it on collision course with most of its neighbors, as well as some of the key actors in the international arena. Despite suffering severe setbacks as a result of such policies in the economic, political and security arena during the first half of the 1990s, Serbia continued to seek understanding, and allies, in its fight against what it portrayed as 'hegemonistic' and 'neo-imperial' policies of the Western states that intervened against interests of Serbia in Croatia, Bosnia, and in Kosovo.

The crisis over Kosovo, the origins of which long precede all other post-Yugoslav conflicts, finally set Serbia on a collision course with the West in 1999. Following NATO intervention against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo *de facto* seceded from Serbia under the international protectorate in the same year. Ever since, the question of Kosovo became a standard by which the effectiveness of both internal and foreign policies of successive Serbian governments came to be judged. To an outside observer it actually illustrates something else: how the central tenet of the country's foreign policy increasingly became an untenable goal as Kosovo, under Albanian control, progressed towards *de facto* independence. Again, as final vestiges of Serbian sovereignty were gradually removed from the former province, culminating in Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008, the political discourse in Serbia became progressively divorced from reality. Unable to shake off the increasingly heavy burden of having Kosovo as the centre point of its foreign policy, Serbian policy makers resorted to irrational denial which further dented country's prospects of influencing the outcome of the situation in Kosovo.

Irrational beliefs produce delusional policies that, in a rational world of *realpolitik*, produce no positive results whatsoever. Having lost Kosovo when the full might of

12 Ibid., 243.

13 Djukanovic and Ladjevac, "Prioriteti spoljnopoliticke strategije Republike Srbije", 346.

14 Ibid., 346.

its arms was present on the ground, Serbia now apparently expect that its verbal insistence on 'Kosovo as inseparable part of Serbian territory' will somehow roll back the events of the past 14 years, including the fact that its independence is now recognized by no less than 99 states, including some of the key world powers.

Even when faced with the definitive offer – as Serbia recently was – to settle the Kosovo issue in exchange for clear prospect of European integrations, the government in Belgrade remains a prisoner of self-imposed irrational policies and is unable to make the necessary breakthrough. Occasional 'revolutionary' calls by lesser political figures such as Jovanovic, Pesic or Draskovic for Serbs to face the reality that Kosovo was lost by Milosevic in 1999 are portrayed as national treason.¹⁵ Such inability to make rational choices in foreign policy is even more surprising given the fact that the government of Serbia on several occasions emphasized European integrations as one of the pillars of its foreign policy. Then foreign minister Vuk Jeremic and President Boris Tadic, on the occasion of the ambassadorial conference in Belgrade, both emphasized the centrality of European integrations and good relationship with the EU and the United States.¹⁶ However, such priorities were made subject to the foremost priority of the "defense of Kosovo" or its euphemism "safeguarding the constitutional order of the country".¹⁷

Such a lack of rational perspective and inability of government in Belgrade to formulate and implement rational foreign policy priorities spawned an entire cottage industry of 'national saviors' in politics, media, and society at large. Columns by Miroslav Lazanski, security commentator for the oldest Serbian newspaper *Politika*, are perfect example of such irrational myth-feeding cottage industry products. In his comments on the day of expiry of the EU deadline for signing the compromise deal with Kosovo, Lazanski ridiculed the prospect of Serbia's "isolation" from the EU, employing – as he frequently does in his columns – strong pro-Russian and pro-Chinese rhetoric. He even extolled the "successes" of Belarus which, of all places, is somehow portrayed as a model for Serbia in its eternal struggle against the whole world. According to him "Belorussia is a state whose political leadership cannot travel to the EU, but the same Belorussia has volume trade with Germany worth 2 billion euro (...) average salary in Belorussia is 500 euro, they have slightly bigger population than Serbia, yet they have an army twice the strength of ours (...). OK, Russia helps them through subsidized prices of oil and gas. But has anyone

15 Novi magazin, "Draskovic: Kosovo je davno izgubljeno, potpisati sporazum" (Draskovic: Kosovo was Lost Long Time Ago, Sign the Agreement), *Novi magazine*, April 4, 2013, available at <http://www.novimagazin.rs/vesti/draskovic-kosovo-je-davno-izgubljeno-potpisati-sporazum>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

16 Djukanovic and Ladjevac, "Prioriteti spoljnopoliticke strategije Republike Srbije", 348.

17 Ibid.

barred us from offering Russians (...) to rent them the airbase in Ponikve or Sjenica”¹⁸

On the issue of the Kosovo negotiations in Brussels which preceded the EU demand for finalizing the deal with the government in Pristina, Lazanski, in the same column, asks: “why didn’t we request that besides American diplomat Riker in Brussels, our side would be assisted by some Russian diplomat”?¹⁹ Such delusional rhetoric seems to completely dominate not only public discourse but also the foreign policy decision making process in Serbia. With some exception for Serbia’s interest, and involvement, in the Republika Srpska entity in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue of Kosovo utterly exhausts Serbia’s creative potential for foreign policy action. Its declarative goal of joining the European Union is practically subjugated by the virtual alliance it pursues with resurrect Russia, in hope that Russian involvement will somehow serve to protect Serbia’s interests over Kosovo. In fact, Russia long ago resigned to a *fait accompli* on the ground, even withdrawing its token peacekeeping contribution in Kosovo, while continuing to offer symbolic gestures of support to Serbia over this issue. Having rejected the EU’s April deadline, Serbian top leadership flew to Moscow to seek Russian support over Kosovo. As Serbian newspapers reported “having addressed Putin in Russian language, (Prime Minister) Dacic thanked him for principled support on the issue of Kosovo.” Dacic further stated that “we want as close as possible relationship with Russia, in all areas, in politics, economics, culture, to defense and security”.²⁰

According to the same report, the Russian President told Dacic that “Serbia and Russia have always been enjoying especially close relationship”.²¹ However, nothing of substance was said from the Russian side on the issue of Kosovo. In fact, the message that Serbia could expect no substantial support from Russia was unequivocally stated in the next meeting that Prime Minister Dacic had with his Russian counterpart, Dmitri Medvedev. In the press conference following the meeting, Medvedev poured cold water on his partner’s expectations: “Russia supports Serbia’s stance over the Kosovo issue, but is of opinion that resolution of this problem is the Serbs’ privilege (...) We should not be the ones ‘pushing’ the process, but Serbia”. Medvedev then lectured his Serbian counterpart on the principles of foreign policy decision making in a sovereign state: “lately, I’ve been

18 Miroslav Lazanski, “Nista, ili bar nesto» (Nothing, or at Least Something), *Politika*, April 6, 2013, available at <http://www.politika.rs/pogledi/Miroslav-Lazanski/Nista-ili-bar-nesto.sr.html>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

19 Ibid.

20 *Politika*, “Putin: Posebno bliski odnosi Srbije i Rusije” (Putin: Especially Close Relationship Between Serbia and Russia), *Politika*, April 10, 2013, available at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/Putin-Posebno-bliski-odnosi-Srbije-i-Rusije.sr.html>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

21 Ibid.

under the impression that 'more is expected from Russia than Serbia itself'. This is not right. You should decide what position to take".²² As if echoing similar statements given by the US politicians to Croatia that will be discussed later in this article, "Medvedev asserted that Russia will support Serbia over this issue. 'We shall always support the stance formulated by the Serbian leadership'".²³

3.2 Croatia

Croatia is arguably the only state in the Western Balkans that has made a completely willing choice and aligned its foreign policy fully with a more powerful patron, in this case the European Union. The progress Croatia made in joining the EU made this kind of orientation possible, even if not all foreign policy choices were mandated by the EU, as will be demonstrated below.

The early post-independence history of Croatia did not, however, indicate such straightforward foreign policy orientation. Under the presidency of Franjo Tudjman, Croatia charted its own regional course, which eventually brought it on a collision course with the international community seeking to calm the Balkan conflicts. Tudjman, lacking both the resources and even minimal measure of outside support, attempted to follow Milosevic in his expansionistic and hegemonic designs towards neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the United States, after the 1994 Washington Agreement, put an end to overt intervention, Tudjman used a variety of other means – political, financial, security, media, educational and cultural - to continue his quest to bring Bosnian Croats under Zagreb's sway. The cessation of conflict in 1995 also allowed Tudjman to continue to expand the almost absolute control that his party, the HDZ, had over domestic politics in Croatia. Opposition was stifled, independent media silenced, and Croatia increasingly embarked on a course leading to self-imposed isolation, with one-party rule and all reins of power controlled by oligarchs grouped around the President.

Symbolically, such policy orientation came to a climax in December 1998, when Croatia almost went to war with NATO and SFOR troops over the remote and minuscule hamlet of Martin Brod, sitting right on Croatian-Bosnian border. Tudjman had actually ordered his military and police special forces to use arms against the Canadian forces sent to reclaim the village from Croatian troops that had occupied it since the end of the war. Fortunately, cool reasoning and diplomatic excellence on the part of Croatia's then foreign minister Mate Granic, acting in clear

22 Politika, "Medvedev: Srbija da „gura“ process oko Kosova, a ne Rusija" (Medvedev: Serbia to "Push" Kosovo Process, not Russia), *Politika*, April 10, 2013, available at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/Medvedev-Srbija-i-Rusija-privilegovani-partneri.sr.html>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

23 Ibid.

contravention of Tudjman's orders, prevented what would have certainly been a catastrophe for Croatia's national interests.²⁴

When, almost exactly one year later, Tudjman died, Croatia gradually sought to make the break with the past, and embark on the path leading to accession to the European Union. The foreign policy orientation Croatia adopted represents multilateralism as a form of shelter in international affairs.²⁵ Numerous small states willingly choose participation in a block providing them with the opportunity to punch above their weight in the world arena under the cover of a collective foreign policy. The EU is precisely such block, especially since the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which allowed smaller member states to play an assertive role in international affairs by giving them more sophisticated foreign policy options. As Hill suggested, such small states

do not have to choose between inactivity and becoming camp followers of the bigger powers, but can instead exploit air pockets within the system to acquire leverage on matters which are important to them.²⁶

There are obviously drawbacks to adoption of such a foreign policy strategy, or at least limitations to the range of choices seemingly at the disposal of more independent minded states. Increased leverage in international relations necessarily imposes limitations due to the consensual basis for formulation of EU policies; the so-called process of 'Europeanization' of individual member states foreign policies. The reward to giving up some autonomy lies in wider influence in the world in the longer run.²⁷

While certainly true for mid-sized powers, it could be argued that in the case of the smaller states, which Croatia surely is, this is not primary consideration for acting under the auspices of common foreign policy of a larger block, but rather the fact that such strategy enables small states to have any say at all in international affairs. Also, acting in accordance with the policies adopted by the larger block of countries carries with it the potential for additional rewards to be reaped by the small state in unrelated areas.

A study of Croatian foreign policy in post-Tudjman era indicates that some significant policy choices Croatia made in accordance with, at least presumed, EU

24 The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, Evidence that due to Martin Brod, Tudjman wanted to go to war with NATO, no date, available at <http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/balkans/croatia/cro08.incl>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

25 Hill, "What Is to Be Done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action," 248.

26 Ibid., 248.

27 Ibid., 249.

foreign policy interests include its treatment of Bosnian Croats, patterns of voting on important policy issues in the international organizations, including the United Nations, as well as Croatia's decisions to join or refuse to join different regional initiatives. Issues of Croatia's overt support for Bosnian Croat secessionist policies has long been considered as one of the principal reasons contributing to dysfunctional nature of politics in BiH. Breaking up the ties that once had the Bosnian Croat Army and Police under direct command from Zagreb, and Bosnian Croat politicians taking only casual interests in political affairs in Sarajevo took time. It was eventually accomplished under direct pressure from the European Union, culminating in the reformist Croatian President Mesić's famous message to Bosnian Croat politicians that "their capital is Sarajevo, not Zagreb".

Due to excesses from the Tujman era, Croatia missed out the opportunity to join the EU as part of the 2004 Eastern Enlargement wave, but the path to Europe was quickly becoming the overriding concern shaping the Croatian domestic and foreign policies. Several actions in the international arena illustrate such close identification of Croatia with the presumed interests of the European Union. One of the more recent examples was Croatia's decision in 2012 to abstain when voting on the Palestinian bid for the observer status in the United Nations General Assembly. The decision to abstain, which due to the nature of the bid practically equaled a 'No' vote, was apparently made due to lack of unified stance by the European Union, even if the majority EU members in the event voted 'Yes'.²⁸ Analysis by the Croatian historian Tvrtko Jakovina illustrates just how futile the decision to abstain was – endearing to neither Israel nor the United States who lobbied for a strong 'No' – but at the same time endangering the fragile relationship that Croatia has been trying to build with the Arab world.²⁹ The decision not to support Palestine in its bid to elevate its UN membership status, could also amount to a moral error on Croatia's behalf. This was the country that only two decades ago was eagerly awaiting to see how the world will react to Croatia's own quest for international recognition.

While the decision on the Palestinian issue could still have significant repercussions in the economic field, another Croatian decision – refusal to join the Southern Stream gas pipeline – will certainly affect its economy, energy dependence prospects, as well as budget in the years to come. Bowing to, again supposed, EU interests, the government of the then-Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in 2007 opted out of the Russian-sponsored Southern Stream project, one of the branches of which

28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integrations, 2012, available at www.mfa.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=1382, last accessed May 12, 2013.

29 Tvrtko Jakovina, "Koga se Hrvatska boji na Bliskom istoku?" (Who is Croatia Afraid of in the Middle East?) . *TPortal.hr*, December 1, 2012, available at: <http://www.tportal.hr/komentari/komentatori/229505/Koga-se-Hrvatska-boji-na-Bliskom-istoku.html#.UWvellJ9Wyw>, (last accessed May 12, 2013).

was supposed to cross Croatian territory *en route* towards Slovenia, Austria and Italy. Successive governments in Croatia justified such decision as being 'in accordance with the EU policy recommendations', even if such explanations clearly fail to explain EU member's Hungary and Bulgaria eager participation in the project.³⁰ The current Croatian government made some energetic last-minute efforts to rectify this mistake, but this was finally rebuffed by Gazprom's vice-president Alexander Medvedev in December 2012.³¹ Had the pipeline crossed through Croatian territory, Croatia stood to earn 25 million euro annually from transit fees alone, while the associated long-term geopolitical and economic effects are hard to calculate.

The list of economic failures stemming from Croatia's inability to pursue an independent foreign policy, even when it clearly favors its political and economic interests, continues. In December 2012, local newspapers also reported that Croatian national petroleum company, INA, ceased operations in its profitable Syrian oil fields, after State Secretary Hillary Clinton "kindly requested" it from Croatian foreign minister Vesna Pusic who was visiting Washington at the time.³² In exchange for loss of income and endangered economic or political interests, Croatia usually gets only token – if not outright meaningless – statements of support, such as Hillary Clinton's "important" message on the occasion of the same visit, that Croatia is "America's partner and ally in the region".³³

3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a textbook case of limited national sovereignty and severely limited capacity of a state to formulate foreign policy. Hill cites Bosnia as an example of the third kind of foreign policy, what he terms as 'quietism'. This kind

30 Marko Biocina, "Nije samo Sanader rekao "ne" Rusima. To je pogresna politika" (It's not only Sanader Who Said "No" to Russians. It is Wrong Policy), *Vecernji list*, November 6, 2011, available at <http://www.vecernji.ba/kolumne/nije-samo-sanader-rekao-ne-rusima-to-je-pogresna-politika-kolumna-471942>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

31 Marko Biocina, "Poraz hrvatske politike – Juzni tok zaobilazi Hrvatsku" (Defeat of Croatia's Politics – Southern Stream Bypasses Croatia), *Vecernji list*, November 6, 2011, available at <http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/poraz-hrvatske-politike-juzni-tok-zaobilazi-hrvatsku-clanak-470945>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

32 N. Babic, "Zbog potpuno pogresne politike cekanja Hrvatska izgubila 'Juzni tok'" (Due to Totally Wrong Politics of Waiting, Croatia has lost the "Southern Stream"), *Advance.hr*, November 4, 2011, available at <http://www.advance.hr/vijesti/zbog-potpuno-pogresne-politike-cekanja-hrvatska-izgubila-juzni-tok/>, last accessed May 1, 2013.

33 Jelena Lovric, Pusic: Da, mozda cu otici iz Vlade ako HNS hoce da idem protiv Bandica i Bernardica (Yes, I Will Probably Leave Government if the HNS Wants me to go Against Bandic and Bernardic), *Jutarnji list*, November 3, 2012, available at <http://www.jutarnji.hr/vesna-usic--da--mozda-cu-otici-iz-kukuriku-vlade-ako-hns-zatrzi-da-na-izborima-idem-protiv-bandica-i-bernardica/1063970/>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

of policy is the most introverted of all, and is situated at the polar opposite from crusading or revolutionary foreign policy. Such policy orientation was observed in the states that at particular times felt it best suits their needs to tactically or strategically withdraw from the international affairs. Albania under Hoxha is an extreme example of such foreign policy action, but more moderate examples include Finland during the Cold War, engaging in delicate act of balancing between the interests of the East and the West. In a very different context, as Hill says, "Bosnia-Herzegovina has little choice but to reduce its foreign policy to virtual immobility for fear of disturbing the delicate balances of both internal politics and the post-Dayton Balkans by some minor false move".³⁴

The fact that the international community that sponsored redrafting of the country's constitution in Dayton in 1995, also retained the position of ultimate arbiter and supervisor in political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, makes this country only conditionally independent. The rather unique role for the international community has been enshrined in the form of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), tasked with policy creation, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) tasked with policy implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the decade following the war, the OHR maintained increasingly assertive position as the ultimate arbiter in the country's politics, culminating during the mandate of the High Representative Paddy Ashdown. Strong and pervasive involvement of the international community in the internal political processes of a state does not, obviously, bode well for development of its capacities to define, and implement, foreign policy actions.

In the internal policy arena, complex constitutional arrangements mean that the country is *de facto* split into two interlocking entities, both of which possess institutions and powers of the state, barring internationally recognized sovereignty. One of the entities, Republika Srpska, also aspires for increasingly independent status, including capacity to formulate its own strategic regional and foreign policy goals and lead independent foreign policy. At the state level, constitution specifically tasks the tripartite Presidency with responsibility for formulating and implementing the country's foreign policy.

Vertical split between the entities, where most political processes take place, and the state, where the two entities are *de facto* competing for control over the political process distinct from the entities, makes it impossible to talk about a functioning internal policy making mechanism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the prevailing policy making models, foreign policy reflects the outcome of interplay between different interests in the domestic political arena. Such design of foreign policy is therefore impossible to impose on political process in BiH. The fact that the Presidency is the primary arena where foreign policy is

34 Hill, "What Is to Be Done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action", 249.

created further divorces internal and external policy processes in the country. The foreign policy strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently based on single, four page long document titled "Basic Directions of BiH Foreign Policy" adopted by the Presidency in 2003. This document reflects the quietest orientation of foreign policy that acts in complete detachment from internal policy dynamics. It lists vague and general goals such as

Preservation and protection of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders; Full and consistent implementation of the General Peace Agreement (GPA); BiH inclusion into European integration processes.³⁵

It does not provide anything in terms of specific foreign policy objectives, deadlines, or outlines means to reach them.

The presidency is made up of three individuals, and acts as a virtually independent body, in sometimes complete disconnect from the internal policy processes in the country. Since members of the Presidency are elected directly, they owe their allegiance to the voters only, and not to specific political party which nominated them. This has in past led to instances where member of the Presidency would leave or be estranged from the party that nominated him, or split with its leadership, leaving him to act completely in accordance with his free will or private interests.

Such a situation exists in the current Presidency where the Serb member, Nebojsa Radmanovic, is member of the governing SNSD and has acted to implement its interests in all matters of foreign policy. The Croat member, Zeljko Komsic, on the other side, does not have a power base, as he split with his former party, the SDP, leaving him to act on his own will. Thanks to the imperfections in the country's election law, he in fact isn't even the representative of the country's Croat interests, since he was elected mainly by vote of the urban Bosniak population who far outnumber the Croats. Bosniak member, Bakir Izetbegovic, is by all accounts estranged from the SDA party's power-wielding elite, meaning that in many instances his decisions do not necessarily reflect the interests of that party.

In terms of practical implementation for foreign policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina still relies on the antiquated and provisional Law on Execution of Foreign Affairs adopted at the beginning of the war in 1992. The fact that this, more than two decades old, law is still being implemented, despite its complete inadequacy due to a changed constitutional framework and different legal and political circumstances, speaks volumes of an ineffective government that does not have the means to enact

35 Presidency of BiH, *General directions and priorities for implementation of foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 2003, available at <http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/vanij/Template.aspx?cid=3564,1,1>, last accessed May 1, 2013.

even the most basic legal texts on which it is supposed to base its operations. The Law is, for all practical purposes, inapplicable, as the institutional structure and authority has changed completely after Dayton, which means that legal provisions are actually not being (and could not be) enforced.³⁶

The paradoxical result of this complex hodge-podge of constitutional and legal provisions and diverse practices is that one of most important elements of state sovereignty – foreign policy – is in Bosnia and Herzegovina almost completely divergent from internal political processes and political actors, and instead rests in the hands of three individuals, whether acting alone, or as pawns in the hands of political elites (but certainly not systemically controlled by them). To compound such a Kafkaesque situation, each member of the Presidency has a right to exercise an unqualified veto over any decision in the foreign policy domain.

In a practical sense, the Presidency is most often unable to come up with a (mandatory unanimous) decision on basically any issue that affects Bosnia's foreign policy. Problems, such as pattern of voting in the United Nations, statements regarding important international issues affecting Bosnia, relationships with neighbors, regional blocks and international institutions are not dealt with in the manner befitting an internationally recognized sovereign state. Bosnia and Herzegovina is therefore unable to come up with a decision regarding the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, as Bosnian Serb politicians – putting Serbia's interest over the interests of their own country – block such a move. But, while even Serbia manages to have some kind of relationship with Kosovo for practical reasons, either economic, security or political, Bosnian Serbs' insistence that Kosovo should be ignored in political discussions incur significant economic costs for Bosnia, not to mention a loss of credibility in the region. Kosovo customs stamps are, for example, not recognized in Bosnia, nor are Kosovars permitted to enter the country with their new travel documents, both of which are admissible in Serbia proper.³⁷

In the aforementioned issue of voting in the UN General Assembly over Palestine, the Bosnian presidency, split between a Bosniak and Croat member (in favor) and Serb member (against) couldn't come up with decision on how to vote, meaning that Bosnia abstained by default. While such issues could be argued not to affect Bosnia's international standing significantly, as many of its friends abroad understand the complex political situation at home, Bosnia certainly risked the

36 Arapovic, *Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Determinants and Perspectives*, 87.

37 FENA, "Bajrami: Ocekujemo liberalizaciju viznog rezima izmedju BiH i Kosova» (Bajrami: We are Expecting Liberalization of Visa Regime between BiH and Kosovo) , *Klix.ba*, May 12, 2013, available at <http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/regija/bajrami-ocekujemo-liberalizaciju-viznog-rezima-izmedju-bih-i-kosova/130512033>, last accessed May 12, 2013.

world's ridicule during its term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2010-2011. At the time, the BiH Mission to the UN lauded Bosnia's election to the non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council as "undoubtedly represent(ing) Bosnia and Herzegovina's greatest foreign policy achievement since it has gained independence in 1992".³⁸ The Bosnian media, however, for the next two years publicized frequent quarrels and mutual accusations between the country's Bosniak, Serb and Croat politicians, unable to reach agreement on some of the important issues where Bosnia and Herzegovina was supposed to contribute to the debate in the UN Security Council.

Only the basic functions of the state in the foreign policy realm are carried out, often on the basis of informal arrangements agreed upon by the members of the Presidency, or country's leaders: appointment of ambassadors, accepting accreditations of foreign diplomats, and receiving increasingly rare visits by the foreign dignitaries. The appointment of Bosnia's ambassadors is good illustration of such an informal arrangement. Each member of the Presidency therefore has sole prerogative to appoint the country's ambassador in a country that is understood to be 'his' or 'his ethnic group's' domain. Such privatization of the key element of the state's foreign policy has led to numerous accusations of incompetency, criminal dealings, squandering of resources, implementation of parallel foreign policies by individual diplomats, and so on. Yet, due to the policy of non-interference in the other members' 'domains', serving diplomats cannot be held accountable, nor can their work be effectively scrutinized or directed by anyone in the Presidency or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The non-existent – for all practical purposes – foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina has left the country at mercy of regional and world powers. Arapovic nicely sums up the absurd situation in which the country has been trapped:

in the past 18 years of Bosnia's foreign policy, its successes and failures were usually not the result of foreign policy decision making by the formal centers of foreign policy decision making, but were mostly collateral product of, initially complex order of events during the war years caused by the numerous internal and external, and even global factors, while in the post-war period were caused by social and political environment in which an individual held more power than the system.³⁹

38 BiH Mission to UN, *Bosnia and Herzegovina Elected Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council*, no date, available at <http://www.bhmisijaun.org/Latest-News/bosnia-and-herzegovina-elected-non-permanent-member-of-the-un-security-council.html>, last accessed May 1, 2013.

39 Arapovic, *Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Determinants and Perspectives*, 92.

3.4 Summary of foreign policy activities of WB states

In her discussion of the role of small states world politics today Jeanne Hey tried to summarize scholars' opinions regarding the range of behaviors exhibited by small states. According to her, small states tend to exhibit a low level of participation in world affairs; address a narrow scope of foreign policy issues; limit their behavior to their immediate geographic arena; employ diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, as opposed to military instruments. Hey also concludes that small states seek to secure multinational agreements and join multinational institutions whenever possible and rely on superpowers for protection, partnerships and resources.⁴⁰

All three states studied here do indeed exhibit a low level of participation in world affairs, as demonstrated by a pattern of voting in the United Nations by Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also, *ipso facto*, try to rely on superpowers for protection, partnerships and resources and secure multinational agreements and join multinational institutions whenever possible. In case of Serbia, it is the repeated attempts to involve Russia in resolving Kosovo issue, while Croatia is immersing itself in NATO and the European Union's CFSP. However, at times all of these states also engaged in reckless, risky, and sometimes irrational behavior in foreign policy arena. Serbia certainly did not try to cooperate in order to avoid conflict with other states in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, but rather opted for some old-fashioned imperialism more suited to nineteenth century great powers. Croatia under Tadjman joined forces with Serbia in trying to effect the partitioning of Bosnia, and later came to the brink of war with NATO itself over an infinitely irrelevant cause. Bosnia, too, due to its quietest policy orientation, has completely neglected foreign policy, engaging only sporadically in performing only the most basic functions of state in the international arena.

Even when trying to act rationally, as Croatia certainly did in the post-Tudjman era and as Serbia is perhaps doing now, discussion of foreign policy choices made by the Western Balkan states on some of the key junctions in their post-independence histories amply demonstrate that political alignment with more powerful international actors did not always produce demonstrable immediate or long-term benefits in most fields. Such foreign policy strategies should not necessarily be considered as bad deals made, but they do speak to the character of the small Western Balkan states in question. These states are not strong functional states, which is especially visible in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Outside of the EU, as the immediate and logical organization to which they aspire (whether overtly or not) to belong but falling short of actual membership, they seeks support from

40 Jeanne A. K Hey, ed., *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003), 5.

'traditional' allies. This is how Russia came to play the role in Serbia and to some extent Bosnia, or how Turkey is by some considered to be influential regional moderator. The problem is, there is no big reward to be reaped by external 'sponsors' for supporting their smaller brethren. What the latter could offer – chiefly their resources and/or their loyalty – has already been tapped, and what remains is not especially valuable. That's how, having laid its hands on Serbia's oil monopoly, Russia now tells the government in Belgrade that over the issue of Kosovo it is to act essentially alone.

It has to be seen yet to what extent the foreign policy of Croatia will change after it accedes to full membership of the EU. Multilateralism is certainly conducive to small states' interests and an organization like the EU gives them in some aspects more leverage than they would have if acting alone on the international scene. On the other hand, an emboldened Croatia, now in possession of veto power when it comes to further enlargement of the EU, could also prove to be a less than constructive neighbor to Bosnia and Serbia, lagging behind on the path of European integration. A change of governments in any of these countries could yet significantly change foreign policy prospects, and indeed stability of the Western Balkan states. On the other hand, it could also be argued that "this is an area of public policy which seems to display more continuity than most", hence positive tendencies observed in the past decade could lead to further strengthening and stabilization of the region and cooperation between the states.⁴¹

4. Conclusion: weak states?

The article discussed the foreign policy decision making process in three Western Balkan states: Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These three central WB states are exemplars of three distinct internal political frameworks as well as differing patterns of post-conflict development of political process. While Serbia could enjoy inheriting much of the legacy of former mid-sized power, Yugoslavia, such heritage also encumbered foreign policy decision making process in incomparably smaller, weaker and less significant Serbia. Quest for authentic foreign policy was devoid of realistic planning and lacking the means to assert its interest in the region and internationally. Shortsighted – or as Hill would term it, 'autistic' – foreign policy during the past two decades brought Serbia on collision course with its neighbors, and the international community. To counter it, Serbia sought to forge alliance with Russia, whom it considered its 'traditional' ally. However, devoid of strategic planning, and due to lack of genuine interest on Russia's side, such policies produced next to no benefits for Serbia.

41 Hill, "What Is to Be Done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action," 242.

In case of Croatia, the similar autistic foreign policy orientation of Tudjman era was replaced after his death with more realistic policy of pursuing alliance with interests of the European Union and, on international arena, the United States. Stubborn pro-‘western’ partisan foreign policy orientation did bring the rewards for Croatia in terms of ascendance to the full EU membership in July 2013. At the same time, though, the Croatian case shows the limitations of blind policy of seeking alliance with superpowers and multinational institutions, without pursuing other avenues where the state could benefit as well. In this case, failures to capitalize on opportunities in the energy sector cost Croatia dearly.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is prime example of a failure of the state to formulate and pursue its foreign policy choices due to limitations posed by shortcomings in the internal policy making process. The inadequate political framework and inexistent vertical hierarchy wherein political consensus could be built, along with weak institutions, all combine to severely curtail BiH’s ability to conduct an independent foreign policy. The involvement of external powers is necessitated by divergent orientation of its ethnic political elites, seeking alliances in turn with Croatia, Serbia, or eventually Turkey. In other words, as Hill observed, Bosnia-Herzegovina actually has little choice but to reduce its foreign policy to virtual immobility for fear of disturbing the delicate balances inherent to internal politics as defined by the Dayton Agreement.

By examining the case studies of three Western Balkan states this article demonstrated the validity of both Hill’s and Hey’s presumptions regarding the practical limitations to foreign policy choices of small states. These three states are exemplars of ‘autistic foreign policy’ (Serbia), blind association with interests of external powers in hope that it will eventually benefit their smaller ally (Croatia), or complete inability to both formulate and implement foreign policy choices due to limitations of internal politics (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Findings of the article represents a solid starting point for further research in regards to mechanisms of foreign policy decision making in small states suffering from severe limitations to functioning political decision making process. At the same time, these findings and further research could significantly impact and benefit decision makers’ capacity for formulating the best policy choices to advance their national interests in the regional and international arena.

Bibliography

Arapovic, Adis. *Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Determinants and Perspectives*. Tuzla: Centri civilnih inicijativa, 2010.

- Babic, N. "Zbog potpuno pogresne politike cekanja Hrvatska izgubila 'Juzni tok'" (Due to Totally Wrong Politics of Waiting, Croatia has lost the "Southern Stream"), *Advance.hr*, November 4, 2011. Available at <http://www.advance.hr/vijesti/zbog-potpuno-pogresne-politike-cekanja-hrvatska-izgubila-juzni-tok/>. Accessed May 1, 2013.
- BiH Mission to UN. *Bosnia and Herzegovina Elected Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council*, no date. Available at <http://www.bhmisijaun.org/Latest-News/bosnia-and-herzegovina-elected-non-permanent-member-of-the-un-security-council.html>. Accessed May 1, 2013.
- Biocina, Marko. "Nije samo Sanader rekao "ne" Rusima. To je pogresna politika" (It's not only Sanader Who Said "No" to Russians. It is Wrong Policy), *Vecernji list*, November 6, 2011. Available at: <http://www.vecernji.ba/kolumne/nije-samo-sanader-rekao-ne-rusima-to-je-pogresna-politika-kolumna-471942>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- _____. "Poraz hrvatske politike – Juzni tok zaobilazi Hrvatsku" (Defeat of Croatia's Politics – Southern Stream Bypasses Croatia), *Vecernji list*, November 6, 2011. Available at: <http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/poraz-hrvatske-politike-juzni-tok-zaobilazi-hrvatsku-clanak-470945>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- Djukanovic, Dragan and Ivona Ladjevac. "Prioriteti spoljnopoliticke strategije Republike Srbije" (Priorities of foreign policy strategy of the Republic of Serbia), *International Problems*, Vol. 61, no. 3, 2009: 343-364.
- Djukanovic, Dragan, Miladin Kovacevic, Ivan Nikolic. *The Current Status Quo and Prospects for Serbia's European Integration*. Bratislava: Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2008.
- East, Maurice A. "Foreign Policy-Making in Small States: Some Theoretic Observations Based on a Study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs", *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Dec., 1973): 491-508.
- FENA. "Bajrami: Ocekujemo liberalizaciju viznog rezima izmedju BiH i Kosova" (Bajrami: We are Expecting Liberalization of Visa Regime between BiH and Kosovo), *Klix.ba*, May 12, 2013. Available at <http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/regija/bajrami-ocekujemo-liberalizaciju-viznog-rezima-izmedju-bih-i-kosova/130512033>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- Hey, Jeanne A. K., ed. *Small states in world politics: explaining foreign policy behavior*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003.
- Hill, Christopher. "What Is to Be Done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action", *International Affairs* (79) 2 (2003), 233-255.
- Jakovina, Tvrtko. "Koga se Hrvatska boji na Bliskom istoku?" (Who is Croatia Afraid of in the Middle East?), *TPortal.hr*, December 1, 2012. Available at <http://www.tportal.hr/komentari/komentatori/229505/Koga-se-Hrvatska-boji-na-Bliskom-istoku.html#.UWvellJ9Wyw>. Accessed May 12, 2013.

- Jovic, Dejan. "Hrvatska vanjska politika pred izazovima clanstva u Europskoj Uniji" (Croatian Politics ahead of Challenges of the EU Membership), *Politicka misao*, vol. 48, no. 2 (2011), 7-36.
- Lazanski, Miroslav. "Nista, ili bar nesto" (Nothing, or at Least Something), *Politika*, April 6, 2013. Available at <http://www.politika.rs/pogledi/Miroslav-Lazanski/Nista-ili-bar-nesto.sr.html>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- Lovric, Jelena. "Pusic: Da, mozda cu otici iz Vlade ako HNS hoce da idem protiv Bandica i Bernardica" (Yes, I Will Probably Leave the Government if the HNS Wants me to go Against Bandic and Bernardic). *Jutarnji list*, November 3, 2012. Available at <http://www.jutarnji.hr/vesna-pusic--da-mozda-cu-otici-iz-kukuriku-vlade-ako-hns-zatrazi-da-na-izborima-idem-protiv-bandica-i-bernardica/1063970/>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integrations, 2012. www.mfa.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=1382, (accessed May 12, 2013).
- Novakovic, Igor. *From Four Pillars of Foreign Policy to European Integration: Is There a Will for Strategically Orienting Serbia's Foreign Policy?* Belgrade: ISAC Fund International and Security Affairs Centre, 2013.
- Novi magazin. "Draskovic: Kosovo je davno izgubljeno, potpisati sporazum" (Draskovic: Kosovo was Lost Long Time Ago, Sign the Agreement), *Novi magazin*, April 4, 2013. Available at <http://www.novimagazin.rs/vesti/draskovic-kosovo-je-davno-izgubljeno-potpisati-sporazum>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- Politika. "Medvedev: Srbija da „gura“ process oko Kosova, a ne Rusija" (Medvedev: Serbia to "Push" Kosovo Process, not Russia), *Politika*, April 10, 2013. Available at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/Medvedev-Srbija-i-Rusija-privilegovani-partneri.sr.html>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- Politika. "Putin: Posebno bliski odnosi Srbije I Rusije" (Putin: Especially Close Relationship Between Serbia and Russia), *Politika*, April 10, 2013. Available at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/Putin-Posebno-bliski-odnosi-Srbije-i-Rusije.sr.html>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- Presidency of BiH. *General directions and priorities for implementation of foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 2003. Available at <http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/vanj/Template.aspx?cid=3564,1,1>. Accessed May 1, 2013.
- The Centre for Peace in the Balkans. "Evidence that due to Martin Brod, Tudjman wanted to go to war with NATO", no date. Available at <http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/balkans/croatia/cro08.incl>. Accessed May 12, 2013.
- Thorhallson, Baldur and Anders Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19 (4) (2006): 651-668.
- Vital, David. *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*. Westport: Greenwood Pub Group, 1980.